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Abstract 
In 4 experiments we examined lying and deception as a function of beliefs about other’s 
cooperative or competitive motivation, and of own social value orientation. In a newly 
developed Information Provision Game, individuals gave information about payoffs that 
provided the basis for an interdependent other to make a decision affecting both parties’ 
outcomes. Results showed that withholding information was associated with fear of being 
exploited, greed, and punitive sentiment, and that giving inaccurate information was 
associated with greed. Further, individuals gave less accurate and more inaccurate 
information when the other was competitive rather than cooperative, especially when they had 
a pro-social rather than selfish value orientation. Finally, individuals facing a competitive 
other misrepresented the decision problem as one of compatible rather than opposed interests, 
a tendency indicative of a "if you can’t beat them, join them" strategy. 
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Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making 
In his classic novel "The Adventures of Tom Sawyer," Mark Twain tells the story of 
Tom Sawyer, who is painting Aunt Polly’s fence when Ben Rogers walks by, eating an apple 
and heading for the river to go for a swim. It is a beautiful day and when Ben asks why Tom 
is painting the fence rather than going for a swim, Tom decides not to answer truthfully--
instead he tells Ben that he is actually enjoying himself and that painting the fence is an 
interesting and gratifying activity. Because Tom is so convincing, he actually raises Ben’s 
desire to engage in whitewashing and, after some negotiation, Tom hands over the brush to 
Ben, and lies down in the shadow eating the rest of Ben’s apple.  
By suggesting he loves whitewashing, and thus misrepresenting his true preferences, 
Tom Sawyer manipulates Ben Rogers to make a decision that is favorable to Tom. And 
although few of us may be as cunning and convincing as Tom Sawyer, we often find 
ourselves in situations where we can influence others by manipulating information and 
misrepresenting our true preferences and priorities. Tobacco companies misrepresent the 
addictive properties of nicotine (Tenbrunsel, 1998). Car owners deliberately conceal technical 
problems when trying to sell their car (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999). When negotiating a 
divorce, a husband may misrepresent the importance of having child custody to induce his 
spouse to concede on alimentation costs (O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997).  
Although lying and deception have been of interest to the social sciences for many 
decades, this research has mainly focused on animal and human ability to distinguish cheaters 
from non-cheaters (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; DePaulo, 1992). Far less research has 
been concerned with what Tom Sawyer was doing--the active misrepresentation of values, 
preferences and priorities. Extending interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; 
Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996, 2003), and goal expectation theory (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977), we 
study the influence of one’s counterpart's cooperative or competitive motivation and one’s 
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own pro-social or selfish value orientation on the tendency to provide accurate or inaccurate 
information, answering such basic questions as "When and why are individuals likely to 
deceive their counterparts?" and "How do they fine-tune the provision of accurate or 
inaccurate information to influence their counterpart’s decision making?"  
Lying and Deception in Social Interaction 
Misrepresentation, lying, and deception have all been subject of considerable research 
in psychology. Social psychologists have focused on the individual’s ability to detect lying 
and deception by others (e.g., DePaulo, Lanier, & Davis, 1983; DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 
1985; Riggio & Friedman, 1983; Zuckerman, Koestner, & Alton, 1984; see also DePaulo et 
al., 2003). Even when people try hard to suppress and misrepresent their true feelings and 
thoughts, they usually are not very successful (e.g., DePaulo, 1992; Ekman & Friesen, 1982; 
Ekman, Friesen, & O’Sullivan, 1988; Zuckerman, Lipets, Koivumaki, & Rosenthal, 1975, 
Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001b). Lie detection has also received much attention in forensic and 
applied psychology. For instance, research has looked at the effectiveness of technical devices 
such as the polygraph to tell truth tellers from liars (e.g., Bashore & Rapp, 1993).  
Relatively few studies have addressed the conditions that foster or inhibit people’s 
tendency to be honest and accurate, or dishonest and inaccurate. Some studies have 
examined the role of Machiavellianism (Exline, Thibaut, Hickey, & Gumpert, 1970; O’Hair, 
Cody, & McLaughlin, 1981), but these studies provided rather mixed results (Vrij, 2001). 
Most insight in the conditions predicting lying and deception comes from research on conflict 
and negotiation. In conflict and negotiation, individuals experience mixed-motive 
interdependence. They have cooperative incentives to work together with the other party to 
increase joint gain, and competitive incentives to work against the other party to increase 
personal gain (Schelling, 1960). The cooperative incentive makes the situation particularly 
conducive to the exchange of honest and accurate information, because doing so successfully 
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fosters high joint gain. The competitive incentive makes the situation particularly conducive 
to the use of misrepresentation and deception, because doing so successfully fosters one’s 
immediate, personal self-interest (Triandis et al., 2001). Thus individuals in mixed motive 
interdependence find themselves in what has been called the "information dilemma"--should 
they provide accurate information to achieve high collective outcomes, or strategically 
misrepresent their preferences to foster good personal outcomes (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; 
Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999)? 
Experiment 1 
Individuals in an information dilemma engage in a variety of deceitful activities (e.g., 
Kelley, 1966; for a review, see Lewicki, 1983). Deception increases when parties know the 
opponent lacks information (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000), or when the stakes are 
higher (Tenbrunsel, 1998). Also, lying and deception are more likely when negotiators have 
experience with the task at hand (Murnighan et al., 1999), when they face a stranger rather 
than a friend (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999), and when they aim to maximize personal rather 
than joint gains (O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997). This research thus suggests that people 
deceive more when there is greater need to serve one’s own interests, or more opportunity to 
do so, or both. 
Perception of Other’s Competitiveness 
Sometimes, individuals assume that their counterpart is competitive and "out to get 
them," and sometimes that their counterpart other has cooperative intent and can be trusted 
(e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). Burnham, McCabe, and Smith (2000) found that others 
described as "partner" elicit more cooperation than others described as "opponent." Other 
research showed that people see others as cooperative rather than competitive when they have 
a history of cooperative rather than competitive exchanges (e.g., Lindskold & Han, 1988), 
when they expect to work together in the future (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984), or when the 
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other is a friend rather than a stranger (Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1983). Also, individuals 
differ in their propensity to trust others (Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996), and when 
individuals themselves are inclined to be cooperative, they tend to assume others are 
cooperative rather than competitive as well (e.g., Iedema & Poppe, 1995). In developing their 
goal expectation theory, Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) reviewed twenty years of research and 
concluded that perceiving the other as cooperative rather than competitive is a key factor in 
predicting cooperative choices in prisoner’s dilemmas, social dilemmas and negotiation 
settings (see also Komorita & Parks, 1995; Pruitt, 1998). 
Work on lying and deception has ignored that individuals assume others to be 
competitive or cooperative, but the above research and theory suggest this to influence the 
tendency to be accurate or to deceive. First, facing a competitive rather than cooperative other 
reduces the inhibition to engage in unethical behavior (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). Facing a 
competitive other may also make greed--the desire to get high personal outcomes--more 
salient, which in turn leads to more lying and deception aimed at doing well for oneself, 
perhaps even at other’s expense. Finally, facing a competitive other increases the fear of 
being exploited (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). Thus, we predict that facing a competitive rather 
than cooperative other reduces the tendency to be accurate and increases misrepresentation 
(Hypothesis 1). 
Hypothesis 1 is about the amount of deceit, and it extends interdependence theory 
(Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996, 2003) and goal expectation theory 
(Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977) to the domain of lying and deception. However, neither this 
hypothesis, nor the theories and research preceding it, specifies the direction of deceit. 
Therefore, the question remains how people misrepresent information when facing a 
competitive other. Non-cooperative tendencies may be reflected in withholding information, 
or in focused misrepresentation explicitly aimed at misleading the counterpart about the 
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structure of the decision-making task. Thus, the specific direction of deceit in case of a 
competitive counterpart is less straightforward than it may appear at first sight. 
When one’s own interests are opposite to those of a competitive other, one serves 
one’s own interests best by suggesting that one gets negative outcomes when the other gets 
zero, and more positive outcomes when the other gets positive outcomes. To illustrate this, 
imagine a situation in which a competitive counterpart has to choose between X and Y. X 
gives him or her 0, and Y gives him or her 5. Unknowingly to the other, X gives you 5, and Y 
gives you 0. If you are honest about your outcomes, your competitive counterpart will be 
tempted to choose Y because this maximizes his or her relative gain (i.e., 5 for him or her, 
and zero for you). To prevent this bad result, you could mislead the other and inform him or 
her that X gives you a negative outcome (e.g., -10) and that Y gives you greater outcomes 
than him or her (e.g., +10). Doing so may tempt the competitive counterpart to choose X 
instead of Y, because he or she believes that X maximizes relative gain (i.e., 0 for him or her, 
and -10 for you), whereas Y maximizes relative loss (i.e., 5 for him or her, and 10 for you). If 
such misrepresentation of your outcomes is successful, it would give you great outcomes 
(recall that although the other thinks otherwise, X gives him or her 0, and you 5). 
This numerical example reflects what Tom Sawyer was doing when he persuaded Ben 
that giving up whitewashing would be like punishment to him, thereby tempting Ben to give 
Tom his apple to be able to take over whitewashing. Thus, it can be predicted that with 
competitive but not with cooperative others, individuals will misrepresent the situation in 
such a way that own outcomes appear negative when the other gets zero, and to exceed 
other’s positive outcomes (Hypothesis 2). 
Overview of the Experiment 
In Experiment 1, participants played an Information Provision Game developed for 
this study. In this game, participants expect their counterpart to make a decision that yields 
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outcomes to him or herself and to the participant. The game is set up so that the participant’s 
and the decision maker’s outcomes are negatively correlated--there are opposed interests. 
However, participants are told that the decision maker has incomplete information and is only 
aware of the consequences of his or her decision to his or her own outcomes, and not of the 
consequences of his or her decision to the participant's outcomes (i.e., the decision maker 
does not know that the situation involves opposed interests). In contrast, the participant is 
given full information about own outcomes, and about the decision maker's outcomes, and 
thus knows that own and other’s interests are opposed. Prior to the decision-making, 
participants get the opportunity to inform the decision maker about the consequences for the 
participant’s outcomes. Participants can accurately present the situation as involving opposed 
interests, they can withhold information, they can inaccurately present the situation as 
predicted in Hypothesis 2, or anything in between. Thus the Information Provision Game 
allows one to assess (a) the amount of accurate and inaccurate information participants give, 
and (b) the direction of deceit--the way participants represent the decision situation to their 
interdependent other.  
The numerical example we gave when developing Hypothesis 2 involved a zero-sum 
situation--other’s gain mirrors own loss and vice versa. Not all situations that involve 
opposing interests are zero-sum; when one party’s gain exceeds the other party’s loss, the 
situation is called variable-sum (Schelling, 1960). Participants in both the zero-sum and the 
variable-sum situation have full information--they know about their own and their 
counterpart’s outcomes. Often, however, participants only have incomplete information; they 
know their own outcomes but have no insight in other’s outcomes (Pruitt, 1998). In these 
incomplete information situations, people are likely to make a so-called fixed-pie assumption-
-they assume the situation is zero-sum, and their behavior reflects this assumption (Thompson 
& Hastie, 1990; Schelling, 1960). 
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Some prior work on deceit used zero-sum tasks (e.g., Boles et al., 2000), some used 
variable-sum tasks (e.g., O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997), and some used incomplete 
information tasks (e.g., Schweitzer & Croson, 1999). No previous work on the amount of 
deceit examined deceit as a function of task structure. Furthermore, because we know little 
about the direction of deceit, and because the precise structure of the situation may influence 
whether and how people (mis)represent the situation to their uninformed counterpart, we felt 
it desirable to examine the amount and direction of deceit in across zero-sum, variable-sum, 
and incomplete information tasks. In one condition of Experiment 1, participants engaged in a 
zero-sum task, in a second condition, they engaged in a variable-sum task, and in a third 
condition (the incomplete-information condition) they were presented with their own 
outcomes only (see the Method section for more detail). We had no a priori hypotheses about 
the influence of task structure. The variable was included to examine the generality of 
findings in different versions of the newly developed Information Provision Game. 
The decision maker was depicted as either a cooperative or a competitive person (we 
also included a control condition in which no information about the decision maker was 
given). According to Hypothesis 1, facing as competitive rather than cooperative other 
reduces the amount of accurate information provided and increases the amount of inaccurate 
information given. According to Hypothesis 2, with competitive but not with cooperative 
others, individuals will misrepresent the situation in such a way that own outcomes appear 
negative when the other gets zero, and to exceed other’s positive outcomes. 
Method 
Participants and design. Two hundred and fourteen students at the University of 
Amsterdam (136 female and 78 male) were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 3 
(other’s motivation: cooperative, competitive, unknown) x 3 (task structure: variable-sum, 
zero-sum, incomplete information) between-participants factorial design. Dependent variables 
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were the information participants gave about their payoffs, perceptions of the other, and self-
reported strategies. Participants received 20 Dutch guilders (approx. US$ 8) for participation. 
Procedure and independent variables. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants 
were seated in cubicles equipped with a computer, a pen and several blank sheets of paper. To 
manipulate other’s cooperative or competitive goals (see also below), participants were asked 
to complete a "collaboration skills test as part of a large-scale test-development project that is 
not related to the other tasks in this experiment." The test contained twenty items dealing with 
cooperation in daily life (e.g., "In the bus, I stand up and leave my seat for older people"; "I 
enjoy working with other people"; "Winning is everything"; "I like situations in which I can 
compete with others"). Participants indicated their agreement on five-point scales (1 = 
completely disagree, to 5 = completely agree). Although there is no information about the 
validity of the scale, and thus it cannot be used to classify participants in terms of their own 
social motivation (but see Experiment 3 and 4), previous research has shown the scale has 
high face validity and is useful for providing credible false feedback about another person’s 
motives (De Dreu & Van Kleef, in press).  
Upon completion of the “collaboration skills test,” the experimenter collected the 
materials and participants started with a new task on the computer. On their computer 
screens, participants read the instructions of a decision game that involved two players who 
would interact via the computer network. Participants were told that they would never find 
out with whom they played, and roles (player 1 or player 2) would be determined at random. 
In fact, each participant was placed in the role of information provider (player 1).  
The purpose of the decision game was to determine an outcome concerning two 
issues, A and B. On both issues, one out of three levels, x, y, or z, had to be chosen. Player 2 
(heretofore decision-maker) would determine for both the issues A and B which level (x, y, or 
z) would be chosen, and, as such, would determine both his or her own outcomes as well as 
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the outcomes of Player 1 (heretofore information-provider). Participants read that the 
decision-maker would receive information about his or her own payoffs, but would never 
receive objective information about the information-provider's payoffs. Thus, the decision 
maker had incomplete information. The information provider would receive information 
about his or her payoffs and also about the decision-maker’s payoffs (except in one condition, 
see below).  
The information provider would start the game by sending a message to the decision 
maker with information about the outcomes he or she would receive for each of the possible 
decision options the decision maker could choose from. The decision maker would then be 
asked to make a decision determining both his or her own outcomes and the information 
provider’s outcomes. It was emphasized that decisions would results in a number of points, 
and that at the end of the experiment points would be converted into lottery tickets. The more 
points gained, the more lottery tickets one would get and, hence, the greater one’s chance of 
winning a cash prize of 50 Dutch guilders (approx. US$ 20).  
Participants received their payoff schedules and detailed explanation. A quiz ensured 
that the instructions were understood. Table 1 shows the tasks used in this experiment. As can 
be seen, payoffs for the participant were identical in all three tasks. On issue A, they could 
earn 6, 3, or 0 points on level z, y, or x, respectively. Issue B, analogously, paid 2, 1, or 0 
points. The decision maker’s payoffs differed, depending on experimental condition. 
Participants in the incomplete-information condition did not get information about the 
decision maker’s payoffs. Participants in the zero-sum task condition were shown other’s 
payoffs, which were the exact mirror image of their own. Finally, participants in the variable-
sum task condition learned that the decision maker would obtain on issue A as many as 2, 1, 
or 0 points on level x, y, or z, respectively, and on issue B as many as 6, 3, or 0 points, 
respectively. Thus in the variable-sum task, issue A is most important to the information 
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provider (player 1), whereas issue B is most important to the decision maker (player 2). 
Different decisions thus produce different levels of joint outcome for both the decision maker 
and the information provider together. For example, when deciding on (zA, xB) both players 
would get 6 points, while deciding on (yA, yB) would result in only 4 points per player. The 
information that the participant was "player 1," the payoff schedule of "player 1," and, in the 
variable-sum and zero-sum condition, the payoff schedule of "player 2," remained visible on 
the screen (see Figure 1a).  
We then manipulated the decision maker’s motivation. Participants were told that we 
were interested in consequences of having versus not having information about the other 
player, and that the computer had randomly selected them but not their other player to receive 
some information about the other derived from the "collaboration skills" measure filled out at 
the beginning of the experiment. They received the test allegedly filled out by the other, with 
circled numbers on the rating scales for each item being manipulated such that the other 
appeared competitive, or cooperative. For example, participants in the cooperative-other 
condition saw that the other answered “2” on the item “in the bus I stand up for other people 
(1 = almost ever, to 5 = never); participants in the competitive-other condition saw that on 
this item the other answered “4” (see also De Dreu & Van Kleef, in press). In the unknown-
other condition, participants received no information about the decision maker’s test results. 
We then repeated that the decision-maker had no information about the payoffs of the 
information-provider and would never get objective information. Participants were told that 
they would be in a position to provide information about their own payoffs to the decision-
maker. They could fill in their outcomes in an empty payoff schedule that would be sent to 
the decision maker. Participants were also told that they could claim anything they wanted, 
that is, they could give as much information as they wanted and were free to choose between 
giving accurate and inaccurate information. Participants were given empty payoff schedule 
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with below 25 boxes containing the numbers from -12 to +12, and a box containing a 
question mark. They were told that for each of the six cells in their payoff schedule they could 
select by mouse-click either a number between -12 and +12, or click on the box with a 
question mark when they did not want to give any information about their points in that cell 
(see Figure 1a). The choice then appeared in the appropriate cell of the payoff schedule (see 
Figure 1b). After this choice was made for all six cells, participants could change their 
choices as often as they wanted. Only after they confirmed by clicking the "send" button, 
would their choices become definite. The payoff schedule with the values participants pretend 
to get (in cells xA, yA, zA, xB, yB, and zB) was then allegedly sent to the decision-maker. 
The reader can consult Figures 1a and 1b for the computer screen the participant saw during 
the game, along with two hypothetical response screens, one filled out by a participant 
providing full and accurate information, and one filled out by a participant providing full but 
inaccurate information as predicted in Hypothesis 2.  
Dependent measures. The numbers provided in each cell (i.e., the numbers 
participants claimed were the values of the cells xA, yA, zA, xB, yB, and zB in their own 
payoff schedule) were used to create two related indices of information provision. We 
classified all information as accurate or inaccurate. Inaccurate means that the number a 
participant entered into a cell was higher or lower than their objective payoff in that cell. By 
counting the cells that contained accurate and inaccurate information, we calculated an 
amount of accurate information and an amount of inaccurate information. Both indices are 
discrete with a range of 0 to 6, the sum of both indices equals the total amount of information 
given. As participants had to enter numbers or question marks into six cells of the payoff 
schedule, the number of cells in which they gave no information (question marks) equals six 
minus the amount of accurate information minus the amount of inaccurate information. 
After participants had sent the information, they were asked whether or not they had 
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applied the following strategies: (1) "enter a high number into a cell to deter the other from 
choosing that cell," and (2) "enter a low number into a cell to make the other choose that 
cell." (We did not specify what cells we were referring to). We also asked whether 
participants had tried to mislead the other. To check the adequacy of the manipulation of 
other’s cooperativeness or competitiveness, we asked participants to indicate whether the 
decision maker was a (1) cooperative, to (5) competitive person. Participants were then told 
the experiment was over, and they were paid and debriefed. 
Results 
Manipulation check, and perception of the other.  A 3 (task structure: variable-sum, 
zero-sum, incomplete information) x 3 (other’s motivation: cooperative, competitive, 
unknown) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on ratings of other’s competitiveness only showed 
a significant main effect of other’s motivation, F(2, 205) = 71.13, p < .001, indicated that the 
decision maker was seen as more competitive in the competitive-other condition (M = 4.18, 
SD = 0.96) than in the cooperative-other condition (M = 2.01, SD = 1.01). In the unknown-
other condition, ratings were close to the scale’s midpoint (M = 2.91, SD = 1.16). A Duncan 
test showed that all conditions differed significantly from each other (p < .05). 
Amount of accurate and inaccurate information. To test Hypothesis 1, we analyzed 
the amount of accurate and inaccurate information in a 3 (other’s motivation) x 3 (task 
structure) x 2 (information: accurate or inaccurate) ANOVA with the last factor as a within-
participants variable. A within-participants main effect for information showed that 
participants provided more inaccurate than accurate information (M = 2.91, SD = 2.37 vs. M 
= 2.19, SD = 2.28), F(1, 205) = 9.97, p < .002. A significant interaction between information 
and other’s motivation, F(1, 205) = 22.18, p < .001, qualified this main effect. Cell means are 
shown in Table 2. Participants gave more accurate information when the other was 
cooperative rather than competitive, with an unknown other in between, and gave more 
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inaccurate information when the other was competitive rather than cooperative. This supports 
Hypothesis 1. No other effects were found. 
Direction of deceit. To examine the direction of deceit, the information provided in 
each cell was submitted to a 3 (task structure) x 3 (other’s motivation) x 2 (issue: A vs. B) x 3 
(level: x vs. y vs. z) ANOVA with the last two variables as within-participants factors. 
Question marks were treated as missing values, which led to the exclusion of 71 participants.  
A main effect of issue, F(1, 134) = 4.00, p < .05, showed that participants correctly 
told the decision maker that they got more points on issue A than on issue B (M = 2.36, SD = 
2.39 vs. M = 1.98, SD = 2.55). An interaction between issue and other’s motivation, F(2, 134) 
= 4.60, p < .012, shows that participants presented issue A as more valuable than issue B 
when they believed the other was cooperative. Trends suggest that they did so towards an 
unknown other, as well, whereas they presented issue A as less valuable than issue B towards 
a competitive opponent (cell means and paired-sample t tests are shown in Table 3). The 
interaction between issue and level, F(2, 133) = 3.91, p < .022, shows that participants 
accurately stated that on level y and z, issue A was more valuable to them (My = 2.75, SD = 
3.16; Mz = 2.29, SD = 4.93) than issue B (My = 2.11, SD =  3.22; t(142) = 2.78, p < .01; Mz = 
1.53, SD =  3.77, t(142) = 2.76, p < .01), and that on level x there was no difference in value 
between issue A and issue B (Mx = 2.04, SD = 5.16, vs. Mx = 2.29, SD = 4.86). This 
interaction effect thus mainly reflects the specific numbers given in the payoff matrices.  
More importantly, results revealed a significant interaction between other’s 
motivation and level, F(4, 268) = 11.45, p < .001, indicating that participants pretended to 
have different priorities within issues depending on other’s motivation. Figure 2 shows that 
information given to a cooperative other (i.e., the pretended value) almost perfectly matches 
the given values of 0, 2, and 4 points at level x, y, and z, respectively. Thus, with a 
cooperative other participants were quite honest. The information given to a competitor, 
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however, decreases from Mx = 5.73 through My = 2.03 to Mz = -0.46. Hence with a 
competitive other people misrepresent what truly are opposed interests as compatible 
interests. The information given to an unknown other is in between, showing intermediate 
levels of misrepresenting preferences and priorities within issues.  
A significant three-way interaction between other’s motivation, level, and issue, 
F(4, 268) = 6.90, p < .01, further qualified these findings. Participants with a cooperative 
other truthfully stated that they preferred level z to level y and level x. They also truthfully 
said that they would get more points in cell zA than in cell zB (MzA = 4.25 vs. MzB = 2.17, 
t(52) = 5.03, p < .001). Participants with a competitive other dishonestly pretended to prefer 
level x to level y and level z. Additionally, they misled their counterpart by stating that issue 
A was of a higher value to them than issue B, and pretended to get equally high scores in cell 
xA and in cell xB (MxA = 5.83 vs. MxB = 5.63, t(40) < 1, ns).  
Although the direction of deceit in the above results is in line with Hypothesis 2, they 
do not tell us whether people indeed present outcomes as negative when the other gets zero, 
and as exceeding other’s positive outcomes. We examined the number of participants who 
suggested they would get negative outcomes when the other gets zero (cells zA and zB of the 
payoff matrices shown in Table 1) as a function of other’s motivation. We excluded 
participants in the incomplete-information task condition because they had no information 
about other’s outcomes. Including them did not change the results.  
For issue A, the analysis showed a significant effect, χ2(2, N = 144) = 24.90, p < .001. 
Fewer people in the cooperative-other condition (2 out of 51, 4%) and the other-unknown 
condition (5 out of 54, 9%) pretended to receive negative outcomes than in the competitive-
other condition (13 out of 40, 33%). A similar pattern was found for issue B, χ2(2, N = 144) = 
6.91, p < .032: Fewer people in the cooperative-other condition (4 out of 50, 8%) and the 
other-unknown condition (4 out of 54, 7%) suggested they would receive negative outcomes 
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than in the competitive-other condition (9 out of 40, 23%). We then examined the number of 
participants suggesting their outcomes exceeded those of the other (cells xA and xB of the 
payoff matrices shown in Table 1) as a function of other’s motivation. For issue A, the 
analysis showed a significant effect, χ2(2, N = 144) = 17.54, p < .001. Fewer people in the 
cooperative-other condition (4 out of 50, 8%) and the other-unknown condition (11 out of 54, 
20%) suggested their outcomes would exceed those of their counterpart than in the 
competitive-other condition (18 out of 40, 45%). We found a similar pattern for issue B, χ2(2, 
N = 144) = 17.25, p < .001: Fewer people in the cooperative-other condition (9 out of 50, 
18%) and the unknown-other condition (14 out of 54, 26%) suggested their outcomes would 
exceed those of their counterpart than in the competitive-other condition (26 out of 40, 65%).  
All in all, these results support Hypothesis 2: Towards a competitive rather than 
cooperative or unknown counterpart, people are more likely to misrepresent their outcomes as 
negative when the other gets zero, and as exceeding other’s positive outcomes. 
Self-reported strategies. Consistent with the above results, 77% of the participants 
with a competitive other stated to have entered a high number to deter the other from 
choosing that cell. Only 20% of the participants with a cooperative other and 27% of those 
with an unknown other indicated to have applied this strategy, χ2(2, N = 214) = 53.26, p < 
.001. Likewise, 79% of the participants with a competitive other stated to have entered a low 
number to make the other choose that cell, whereas only 28% of the participants with a 
cooperative other indicated having used that strategy. Participants with an unknown other 
(42%) were in between, χ2(2, N = 214) = 35.67, p < .001. Finally, almost all participants with 
a competitive other (97%) as compared to less than half (47%) of those with a cooperative 
one indicated that they had tried to mislead the other. The unknown-other condition (61%) 
was in between, χ2(2, N = 214) = 38.34, p < .001.  
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Discussion 
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, individuals were less accurate and more inaccurate with 
a competitive rather than a cooperative other. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, individuals with 
a competitive other were also more likely to misrepresent their outcomes such that their 
outcome appeared negative when the other got zero, and exceeding other’s positive outcome. 
This misrepresentation may be strategically wise, as it may tempt the competitive other to 
make a decision that is good rather than bad for one’s own outcomes. 
No effects for task structure were significant. This suggests that participants in the 
incomplete-information condition assumed their outcomes were negatively correlated with 
those of their counterpart (i.e., the values they provided did not differ from those given in the 
zero-sum, and the variable-sum conditions), which is consistent with negotiation studies 
showing that negotiators make a "fixed-pie assumption" (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; 
Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Although some authors have speculated that the fixed-pie-
assumption may be confined to negotiation settings (e.g., Pruitt, 1990), our results suggest 
that the fixed-pie assumption is made also in the type of situations studied here.  
For current purposes it is important that task structure it had no effects on the amount 
of accurate or inaccurate information provided, or on the direction of deceit. Moreover, task 
structure did not interact with other’s motivation. We conclude that task structure, alone or in 
combination with other’s motivation, has no noticeable influence on deception and in the next 
experiments we, therefore, decided to focus on the zero-sum task. 
Experiment 2 
Although the results of Experiment 1 showed that individuals are especially likely to 
use deception when they face a competitive other, it remains unclear why. In general, non-
cooperative behavior is predominantly motivated by either fear of being exploited, by greed, 
or by both motives (Coombs, 1973). In the Information Provision Game, both fear and greed 
  Lying and Deception     19 
 
play a role as well, because the information participants present to the decision maker may 
lead him or her to make choices that benefit or harm the participant’s outcome. Indeed, in 
Experiment 1, we observed more deception when the other was competitive rather than 
cooperative. This suggests that fear of being exploited is an important reason for misleading a 
competitive other. However, facing a competitive other in itself may elicit greed, and we need 
to examine empirically whether fear, greed, or both motivations explain the tendency to 
mislead a competitive other.  
Research on motives underlying punishment suggests additional reasons underlying 
people’s decision to engage in lying and deception. Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson (2002) 
distinguished between deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishing harm-doers. 
Deterrence refers to the desire to prevent or reduce future crimes, and seems closely linked to 
fear of being exploited. Just deserts refer to the desire to pay back harm-doers for past crimes, 
and appears conceptually unrelated to both fear and greed. Just deserts motives seem to play a 
role in social decision-making. People who violate justice principles face sanctions even by 
those whose outcomes are not affected by these violations (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). People 
who have been deceived punish their counterpart even when this is costly to themselves 
(Boles et al., 2000). In the context of social dilemma research, Price, Cosmides and Tooby 
(2002) reasoned that for collective action to evolve, some mechanism must eliminate the 
advantage free riders have over contributors. They propose punitive sentiment as an anti-free-
rider device, which is "a desire that the target of the sentiment is harmed" (p. 206).  
Taken together, three possible motivations may explain the high levels of deception 
observed in the case of a competitive other--fear, greed, and punitive sentiment. The goal of 
Experiment 2 was to examine which (combination of) motivation(s) explains the provision of 
accurate and inaccurate information to a competitive other. Following previous research on 
fear and greed (e.g., Bruins, Liebrand, & Wilke, 1989; Van Lange, Liebrand, & Kuhlman, 
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1990), the presence or absence of fear and greed was manipulated by making the other’s 
decision either consequential or not for one’s own outcomes. When the other’s decision is 
consequential for one’s own outcomes, lying and deception may be motivated by a desire to 
mislead the other into making decisions that benefit oneself most, or a desire to mislead the 
other into making decisions that damage own outcomes the least. We used questionnaire 
items and mediation tests to examine whether effects are due to fear, greed, or both. 
Similarly, the presence of punitive sentiment was manipulated by making the other’s decision 
either consequential or not for the other’s outcomes--when the other’s decision has no 
consequences for the other’s outcomes, lying and deception can hardly be motivated by 
punitive sentiment. Put differently, if more lying and deception is observed when the other’s 
decision is consequential for the other’s outcomes, then lying and deception is likely to be due 
to punitive sentiment. Again we used questionnaire items and mediation tests to examine 
whether punitive sentiments indeed explain possible effects. 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-seven students at the University of Amsterdam (n = 
38 female and n = 39 male) were randomly assigned to three experimental conditions--the 
other’s decision is consequential to the participant’s outcomes only, the other’s decision is 
consequential to other’s outcomes only, and the other’s decision is consequential to both the 
participant’s and the other’s outcomes (note that the last condition is a replication condition 
of the task used in Experiment 1). Dependent variables were the provision of accurate and 
inaccurate information, self-reported fear, greed, and punitive sentiment, and manipulation 
checks. Participants received 15 Dutch guilders (approx. US$ 6) for participation. 
Procedure and independent variables. The procedure was the same as in the 
competitive-other condition in Experiment 1, with a few changes to manipulate whether or 
not the decision would be consequential to the outcomes of the participant and the decision 
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maker. Whether the other’s decision was consequential to the participant’s and/or the other’s 
outcome was manipulated independently by making each participant's own outcome and the 
alleged opponent's outcome either relevant or irrelevant to winning an attractive prize. We 
announced a lottery in which three participants would win a voucher of 50 Dutch guilders 
(about 26 US$), with the chances of winning being either dependent on or independent of the 
outcome of the decision game. Depending on the experimental condition, participants were 
told that each point gained in the decision game was worth one lottery ticket to themselves 
and/or the decision maker, or that the participant and/or the decision maker would get a 
randomly determined number between 0 and 8 lottery tickets regardless of the outcome of the 
decision game. Thus, in some conditions, the outcome of the decision game had 
consequences for the participant’s and/or the decision maker’s chances of winning additional 
cash, while in other conditions it had no such consequences. We further emphasized that only 
the information providers would know how lottery tickets could be obtained and that this 
information was not shared with the decision maker. Thus, the decision maker was believed 
to be unaware of the fact that his or her decision would affect his or her (and the participant’s) 
chances of winning additional cash. 
In the other’s decision is consequential only to self condition, participants were told 
that they would receive one lottery ticket for each point they would gain in the decision game, 
whereas the decision maker would receive a random number of tickets. In this condition, we 
assumed that both fear and greed would be relevant motives, while punitive sentiment would 
not. In the other’s decision is consequential only to other condition, participants were told 
that they would get a randomly determined number of lottery tickets, whereas the decision 
maker would receive one lottery ticket for each point he or she would gain in the decision 
game. In this condition, we assumed that punitive sentiment would be a relevant motive, 
unlike fear and greed. In the other’s decision is consequential to both self and other 
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condition, participants were told that they would receive one lottery ticket for each point 
gained in the decision game, and that the decision maker would receive one lottery ticket for 
each point gained in the decision game. In this condition, we assumed that fear, greed, and 
punitive sentiment would all be relevant motives.  
Dependent measures. The measures for accurate information and for inaccurate 
information were the same as in Experiment 1. Honesty ("I tried to be honest"), fear ("I tried 
to avoid being exploited"), greed ("I intended to enhance my own outcome"), and punitive 
sentiment ("I wanted to teach the other a lesson") were assessed on five-point scales (1 = "not 
at all" to 5 = "very much"). Participants then answered manipulation checks (see Results 
section), and were paid and debriefed.  
Results 
Treatment of the data and manipulation checks. Nine participants who incorrectly 
answered one or both manipulation checks about the allocation of lottery tickets were 
excluded from the sample. All analyses are based on the remaining 68 participants. As 
intended, participants rated the other as competitive. Ratings were above the scale mean (3.0), 
t(67) = 15.66, p < .001, and were not influenced by condition, F(2, 65) < 1.  
Descriptive statistics. Table 4 shows that the desire to be honest was positively 
correlated with giving accurate information, and negatively with giving inaccurate 
information. Fear was positively correlated with giving inaccurate information and negatively 
correlated with giving accurate information. Greed was negatively correlated with giving 
accurate information, and positively with giving inaccurate information. Punitive sentiment 
had a significant negative correlation with giving accurate information, and a positive but not 
significant correlation with giving inaccurate information. Finally, fear and greed were not 
correlated, but fear and punitive sentiment were moderately correlated.  
Motives for lying and deception. To examine whether our experimental manipulations 
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influenced fear, greed, and punitive sentiment, we conducted three separate analyses of 
variance with condition as independent variable and motive as dependent variable. The effect 
of condition on fear was in the expected direction, F(2, 65) = 3.06, p < .085. In both 
conditions in which other’s decision was consequential for one’s own outcomes, that means, 
in the consequential only to self condition and in the consequential to self and other 
condition, participants indicated that fear was a motive (M = 3.81, SD = 1.13; and M = 3.84, 
SD = 1.17, respectively), as they answered above the scale mean (t(25) = 3.64, p < .001, and 
t(18) = 3.15, p < .01, respectively). In the condition in which other’s decision was not 
consequential to the own outcome, participants indicated less fear (M = 3.17, SD = 1.50) than 
in the other two conditions, t(66)  = 2.00, p < .05. 
There was a significant effect of condition on greed, F(2, 65) = 14.44, p < .001. When 
other’s decision was consequential only to own outcomes (M = 4.46, SD = 0.81), or to both 
own and other’s outcomes (M = 4.47, SD = 0.96), participants reported high levels of greed, 
which did not differ according to Duncan test (p < .05). When other’s decision was 
inconsequential for one’s own outcomes, however, greed was lower (M = 2.96, SD = 1.93) 
and differed significantly from the other conditions.  
There was no main effect of condition on punitive sentiment, F(2, 65) < 1, ns (overall 
M = 2.81, SD = 1.38). Together, these results support the conclusion that our experimental 
manipulations influenced fear and greed. The manipulations did not influence punitive 
sentiment. We return to this in the discussion section. 
Provision of accurate and inaccurate information. The amount of accurate and 
inaccurate information was analyzed in a 3 (condition) x 2 (information: accurate vs. 
inaccurate) ANOVA with the last factor as a within-participant variable. A main effect of 
information, F(1, 65) = 67.93, p < .001, indicated that participants gave more inaccurate 
(M = 4.10, SD = 1.98) than accurate information (M = 1.07, SD = 1.54). This makes sense 
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because in all conditions the other was competitive, and the means are indeed similar to those 
in the competitive-other condition of Experiment 1.  
Results further revealed a significant interaction of information with condition, 
F(2, 65) = 4.99, p < .01. Table 5 shows that participants gave more accurate information and 
less inaccurate information when other’s decision was inconsequential rather than 
consequential to the participant’s outcomes. Further, participants provided less accurate and 
more inaccurate information when other’s decision was consequential to both the 
participant’s and the decision maker’s outcomes than when other’s decision was 
consequential only to the participant’s outcomes. This is consistent with the idea that fear and 
greed motivate the provision of accurate and inaccurate information. 
Tests for mediation. Experimental manipulations influenced fear (marginally 
significant) and greed, as well as the provision of accurate and inaccurate information. Fear 
and greed were also correlated with the provision of accurate and inaccurate information. This 
means that fear and greed qualify as a potential mediator between experimental manipulations 
and the provision of accurate and inaccurate information. However, mediation also requires 
that the effect of the manipulations on the provision of accurate and inaccurate information is 
reduced when the mediator is taken into account, and that the reduction in regression weight 
from simple to multiple regression is significant (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998).  
To verify whether the additional requirements hold up for fear, and greed, we 
performed per motive two regression analyses (one with accurate information, and one with 
inaccurate information as dependent variable) with experimental condition as the independent 
variable. A regression analysis with the provision of accurate information as dependent 
variable, experimental manipulations as independent variable, and fear as mediator revealed 
that the originally significant effect of experimental manipulations (β = -.35, t = -3.06, p < 
.003) dropped slightly (β = -.29, t = -2.58, p < .012). The predicted reduction in regression 
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weight from simple to multiple regression was marginally significant, Z = 1.69, p < .10. A 
regression analysis with the provision of inaccurate information as dependent variable, 
experimental manipulations as independent variable, and fear as mediator revealed that the 
originally significant effect of experimental manipulations (β = .33, t = 2.83, p < .006) 
remained almost unaffected (β = .31, t = 2.57, p < .013). Indeed, the reduction in regression 
weight from simple to multiple regression was not significant, Z < 1. Thus, there is some 
evidence that fear partially mediates the effect of experimental manipulations on the 
provision of accurate information, but not the provision of inaccurate information.  
A regression analysis with the provision of accurate information as dependent 
variable, experimental manipulations as independent variable, and greed as mediator revealed 
that the originally significant effect of experimental manipulations (β = -.35, t = -3.06, p < 
.003) dropped substantially (β = -.17, t = -1.35, ns.). The reduction in regression weight from 
simple to multiple regression was significant, Z = -2.55, p < .05. A regression analysis with 
the provision of inaccurate information as dependent variable, experimental manipulations as 
independent variable, and greed as mediator revealed that the originally significant effect of 
experimental manipulations (β = .33, t = -2.83, p < .006) dropped substantially (β = .15, t = -
1.18, ns.). The reduction in regression weight from simple to multiple regression was 
significant, Z = 2.27, p < .05. These results show that greed mediates between experimental 
manipulations and the provision of both accurate and inaccurate information. 
Direction of deceit. The information provided in each of the six cells was submitted to 
a 3 (condition) x 2 (issue: A vs. B) x 3 (level: x vs. y vs. z) ANOVA, with the last two 
variables as within-participant factors. Question marks were regarded as missing data, which 
led to the exclusion of 14 participants. Results revealed a main effect of level, F(2, 40) = 
10.71, p < .001, showing that participants pretended that to them level x was most valuable 
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(M = 5.35, SD = 5.35), that level y was intermediate (M = 1.28, SD = 3.54), and that level z 
was the least valuable (M = -1.85, SD = 5.93). There was no significant interaction with 
condition (F(4, 82) = 1.36, ns). 
We also examined whether the number of participants suggesting they would get 
negative outcomes when the other gets zero differed as a function of experimental condition. 
For issue A and issue B, condition had no effects, both χ2 (2, N = 68) < 1.37, ps > .50. 
However, consistent with the competitive other condition of Experiment 1, 24 out of 68 
participants (35%), and 25 out of 68 participants (37%) suggested they received negative 
outcomes in cell zA and zB, respectively. We then examined the number of participants 
suggesting their outcomes exceeded those of the other (cells xA and xB of the payoff matrices 
shown in Table 1). Again, for issue A and issue B, condition had no effects, both χ2 (2, N = 
68) < 4.40, ps > .12. Consistent with the competitive other condition of Experiment 1, 
however, 27 out of 68 participants (40%), and 40 out of 68 participants (59%) suggested their 
outcomes exceeded those of their counterpart in cell xA and xB, respectively. These results 
support Hypothesis 2 that with a competitive other people tend to misrepresent outcomes so 
that it appears as if they receive negative outcomes when the other gets zero, and that their 
outcomes exceed others’ outcomes when these are positive. 
Discussion and Introduction to Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 showed that giving accurate information is partially motivated by fear of 
being exploited, and by greed. Giving inaccurate information is motivated by greed only. 
Punitive sentiment, while negatively correlated with giving accurate information, did not 
mediate effects of experimental conditions.  
Measurement issues may account for the weak results regarding punitive sentiment. 
Indeed, single-item measures were used and although meaningful correlations among these 
measures, and with giving accurate and inaccurate information were found, it cannot be 
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excluded that some measures were not very good. Alternatively, it may be that punitive 
sentiment is a motive that exists in some people more than in others, and is unlikely to be 
triggered temporarily by experimental manipulations like the ones we used in Experiment 2. 
In fact, it can be argued that selfish individuals who are solely concerned with their own 
outcomes tolerate others who are selfish more than pro-social individuals who are concerned 
with fairness and collective welfare.  
Individuals with a selfish orientation tend towards non-cooperative behavior, whereas 
those with a pro-social orientation tend to trust others and approach them in an open-minded 
and cooperative way (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Van Lange, 1999). When, however, the other is 
competitive, pro-social individuals "over-assimilate" and respond even more competitively 
than selfish individuals (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Van Lange, 1992). Over-assimilation 
may be grounded in punitive sentiment and the moralistic desire the "teach the other a 
lesson," or in the belief that being overly competitive persuades the other to change his or her 
behavior towards a more cooperative course (Price et al., 2002).  
In Experiment 2 punitive sentiment was negatively correlated with the provision of 
accurate information, and we reviewed arguments and evidence that pro-social individuals 
may be guided by punitive sentiment more than individuals with a selfish orientation. Parallel 
to the over-assimilation effect observed in social dilemmas, it then follows that pro-social, as 
compared to selfish individuals, will be more accurate towards a cooperative other, and more 
inaccurate towards a competitive other (Hypothesis 3). Initial evidence for this hypothesis 
comes from a negotiation study by O’Connor and Carnevale (1997) who found more lying 
and deception when both members of a dyad had a pro-social (i.e., maximize joint outcomes) 
rather than selfish goal (maximize personal outcomes). However, because dyad members in 
this study received the same goal instructions, their findings may reflect (1) a main effect of 
other’s cooperative or competitive goals (our Hypothesis 1); (2) a main effect of the 
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participant’s pro-social versus selfish orientation (O’Connor & Carnevale’s hypothesis); or 
(3) an interaction between the participant’s value orientation and other’s cooperative versus 
competitive goal (our Hypothesis 3).  
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and fifty students (58 male and 92 female) at 
the University of Amsterdam participated in the experiment and received 20 Dutch guilders 
(approx. US$ 8). All participants were placed in the zero-sum task condition of Experiment 1. 
The design was a 2 (social value orientation: pro-social vs. selfish) x 3 (other’s motivation: 
cooperative, competitive, unknown) between-participants factorial, with as main dependent 
variables the information provided and self-reported strategies. 
Procedure and measurement of social value orientation. The procedure was the same 
as in Experiment 1, except that prior to the experiment we measured social value orientation 
using the decomposed game method developed by Kuhlman and Marshello (1975). This 
method has good construct validity (Van Lange, 1999), internal consistency (e.g., Liebrand & 
Van Run, 1985) and test-retest reliability (Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986). Participants 
were presented with nine triple-dominance games. In each game, participants choose between 
option A, B, and C. In one of these games, for example, option A pays 550 points to oneself 
and 500 points to an unknown other, option B pays 500 points for oneself and 100 points for 
the other, and option C pays 500 points for both oneself and the unknown other. Option A 
represents the individualistic choice because one’s own outcomes are larger (550) than are 
those in option B or C (both 500 points). Option B represents the competitive choice because 
it provides a greater advantage over the other’s outcomes (500 - 100 = 400) than either option 
A (550 - 300 = 250) or option C (500 - 500 = 0). Finally, option C corresponds to a pro-social 
choice because it provides equality and a larger joint outcome (500 + 500 = 1000) than either 
option A (550 + 300 = 850) or option B (500 + 100 = 600).  
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To be classified in one of the three social value orientations, participants had to 
choose consistently on at least six of the nine trials. In the current study, 39% (n = 59) could 
be classified as pro-social, 44% (n = 66) could be classified as individualistic, and 5% (n = 8) 
could be classified as competitive. This distribution is consistent with earlier research (e.g., 
De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Liebrand & Van Run, 1985). Like earlier research (e.g., De 
Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), we 
combined competitive and individualistic participants into a broader category labeled 
"selfish." We excluded 17 participants (11%), because they were unclassifiable.  
After the decomposed game measure, participants were given a 10-minute filler task, 
and then went on with the same procedure as in Experiment 1. 
Dependent measures. These were the same as in Experiment 1.  
Results 
Manipulation check. A 3 (other’s motivation: cooperative, competitive, unknown) x 2 
(own social value orientation: pro-social vs. selfish) ANOVA of the ratings of other’s 
competitiveness only showed a significant main effect of other’s motivation, F(2, 127) = 
16.83, p < .001. Duncan test (p < .05) revealed that a competitive other rated as significantly 
more competitive (M = 4.00, SD = 1.11) than both a cooperative other (M = 2.63, SD = 1.23) 
and an unknown other (M = 3.00, SD = 0.96), which did not differ significantly.  
Provision of accurate and inaccurate information. The amount of accurate and 
inaccurate information was analyzed in a 3 (other’s motivation: cooperative, competitive, 
unknown) x 2 (own social value orientation: pro-social vs. selfish) x 2 (information: accurate 
vs. inaccurate) ANOVA, with the last factor within participants. A within-participant main 
effect for information showed that participants gave more inaccurate information (M = 3.32, 
SD = 2.19) than accurate information (M = 1.99, SD = 2.07), F(1, 127) = 18.07, p < .001. This 
effect was qualified by a significant interaction between information and other’s motivation, 
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F(2, 127) = 16.63, p < .001. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, participants gave least accurate and 
most inaccurate information in the competitive other condition, more accurate information in 
the unknown other condition, and most accurate and least inaccurate information in the 
cooperative other condition (see Table 6).  
The predicted three-way interaction among information, other’s motivation, and social 
value orientation, was significant, F(2, 127) = 3.46, p < .05. Compared to selfish participants, 
pro-social individuals gave more accurate information when the other was cooperative, and 
less accurate information when the other was competitive (see Table 6). Furthermore, 
compared to selfish participants, pro-social individuals gave less inaccurate information when 
the other was cooperative. And although not significant, pro-social individuals gave, relative 
to selfish individuals, more inaccurate information when the other was competitive (see Table 
6). All in all, these results support Hypothesis 3.  
Direction of deceit. As in Experiment 1, we analyzed the information participants 
gave in the six cells in a 3 (other’s motivation) x 2 (social value orientation) x 2 (issue A vs. 
issue B) x 3 (level x vs. y vs. z) ANOVA with the last two factors within participants. 
Question marks were treated as missing values, which led to the exclusion of 40 participants.  
Results revealed, first of all, a within-participants main effect of issue, F(1, 87) = 
49.24, p < .001, showing that participants correctly stated that they got more points on issue 
A (M = 1.87) than on issue B (M = 0.68). As in Experiment 1, an interaction between issue 
and level, F(2, 174) = 3.75, p < .005, showed that participants accurately stated that yA (MyA 
= 1.89) provided more value yB (MyB = 0.78, t(92) = 5.67, p < .001) and that cell zA (MzA = 
2.42) provided more value than cell zB (MzB = 0.31, t(92) = 5.45, p < .001), but that cell xA 
(MxA = 1.31) gave as little value as cell xB (MxB = 0.95, t(92) = 0.85, ns). 
There was a significant interaction between level and other’s motivation, F(6, 174) = 
17.59, p < .001, indicating that the information given to cooperative others increased from M 
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= -2.01 at level x to M = 1.20 at level y to M = 2.87 at level z. The information given to 
competitive others, however, decreased from Mx = 5.70 points to My = 1.32 to Mz = -2.14. 
This pattern is similar to the one found in Experiment 1 and provides new support for 
Hypothesis 2.  
A significant interaction among issue, level, and other’s motivation further qualified 
this finding, F(4, 174) = 9.82, p < .001, and showed that, dependent on the other's 
motivational goal, issue mattered on different levels. In the competitive-other condition, 
participants pretended to get more points in cell xA (M = 7.04, SD = 4.58) than in cell xB (M 
= 4.36, SD = 4.52; t(27) = 5.49, p < .001), while issue did not matter on level y (MA = 1.57, 
SD = 4.61, vs. MB = 1.07, SD = 3.91; t(27) = 1.17, ns) and level z (MA = -2.04, SD = 6.04, vs. 
MB = -2.25, SD = 4.53; t(27) < 1, ns). In the cooperative-other and the unknown-other 
condition, however, issue did not matter on level x, but it did matter on level y and level z. 
Towards a cooperative other, participants told that they would get MA = -2.68 (SD = 5.69) 
points in cell xA and MB = -1.34 (SD = 4.69) in cell xB, which did not differ significantly, 
t(37) = -1.66, ns. On level y, they pretended to get more points in cell yA (M = 1.97, SD = 
2.38) than in cell yB (M = 0.42, SD = 1.65; t(37) = 8.28, p < .001), and on level z, they 
pretended to get more points in cell zA (M = 4.39, SD = 3.05) than in cell zB (M = 1.18, SD = 
1.98; t(37) = 9.28, p < .001). Similarly, participants told an unknown other that they would 
get MA = 1.00 (SD = 6.78) points in cell xA and MB = 0.63 (SD = 6.48) in cell xB, which did 
not differ significantly, t(26) < 1, ns. On level y, they pretended to get more points (M = 2.11, 
SD = 1.55) in cell yA than in cell yB (M = 1.00, SD = 1.82; t(26) = 2.68, p < .02), and on 
level z, they pretended to get more points (M = 4.26, SD = 5.32) in cell zA than in cell zB (M 
= 1.74, SD = 4.78; t(26) = 2.68, p < .02). 
We also examined the number of participants suggesting they would get negative 
outcomes when the other gets zero as a function of other’s motivation and social value 
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orientation. For issue A, a logistic regression with other’s motivation, social value orientation, 
and their interaction as independent variables showed a significant effect involving other’s 
motivation, B = 3.21, p < .01. Fewer people in the cooperative other condition (1 out of 48, 
2%) and the other-unknown condition (3 out 42, 7%) suggested they received negative 
outcomes than in the competitive other condition (15 out of 43, 35%). A similar pattern was 
found for issue B, B = 2.28, p < .01: Fewer people in the cooperative other condition (3 out of 
48, 6%) and the other-unknown condition (3 out of 42, 7%) suggested they received negative 
outcomes than in the competitive other condition (17 out of 43, 40%). We then examined the 
number of participants suggesting their outcomes exceeded those of the other (cells xA and 
xB of the payoff matrices shown in Table 1) as a function of other’s motivation and social 
value orientation. For issue A, logistic regression showed a significant effect, B = 3.94, p < 
.02. Fewer people in the cooperative other condition (1 out of 48, 2%) and the other-unknown 
condition (9 out of 42, 21%) suggested their outcomes exceeded those of their counterpart 
than in the competitive other condition (21 out of 43, 49%). A similar pattern was found for 
issue B, B = 3.27, p < .001: Fewer people in the cooperative other condition (2 out of 48, 4%) 
and the other-unknown condition (11 out of 42, 26%) suggested their outcomes exceeded 
those of their counterpart than in the competitive other condition (23 out of 43, 54%). In all 
four logistic regression analyses, own social value orientation and the interaction of own 
social value orientation and other's motivation had no significant influence, all ps > .50 
All in all, these results provide new support for Hypothesis 2: People with a 
competitive counterpart are more likely to misrepresent their outcomes as negative when the 
other gets zero, and as exceeding other’s positive outcomes. Social value orientation did not 
qualify this general pattern. 
Self-reported strategies. Consistent with the above results, 61% of the participants 
with a competitive other stated that they entered a high number to deter the other from 
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choosing that cell. This percentage was much lower in the case of a cooperative other (17%) 
or in the case of an unknown other (20%), χ2(2, N = 133) = 18.64, p < .001. Likewise, 84% of 
the participants with a competitive other reported having entered a low number to make the 
other choose that cell, while only 29% of participants with a cooperative other indicated to 
have applied that strategy. Participants with an unknown other (43%) were in between, χ2(2, 
N = 133) = 28.70, p < .001. Finally, almost all participants with a competitive other (98%), 
but only 58% of those with a cooperative other stated that they had tried to mislead the other. 
Participants with an unknown other (83%) were in between, χ2(2, N = 133) = 21.83, p < .001. 
Discussion and Introduction of Experiment 4 
Experiment 3 replicates and extends Experiment 1 and 2. As predicted in Hypothesis 
1, we found that individuals with a cooperative other were most likely to give accurate 
information and least likely to give inaccurate information, while the reverse holds for 
individuals with a competitive other. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, this general pattern was 
stronger for pro-social individuals than for selfish individuals, which is indicative of an over-
assimilation effect. Results for the direction of deceit were also consistent with those obtained 
in Experiment 1, and once again supported Hypothesis 2. Individuals with a cooperative other 
truthfully present the situation as involving opposing interests, whereas individuals with a 
competitive other misrepresent their outcomes as negative when other’s outcome is zero, and 
as exceeding other’s outcomes when these are positive. Social value orientation did not 
influence this pattern, suggesting that pro-social and selfish individuals do not differ in their 
strategic misrepresentation.  
Some limitations are noteworthy. First, the Information Provision Game is abstract 
and context-free. The reader may wonder whether behavior in this game informs us about 
strategic misrepresentation in daily settings. The first goal of Experiment 4 was to replicate 
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the design of Experiment 3 in a different setting with a different scenario (i.e., the sale of 
one’s used car) and to submit Hypothesis 1 and 3 to a new test. Second, the use of psychology 
undergraduates in the first three experiments could be seen as a limitation. Because 
replicating results with a random sample drawn from the general population would further 
increase confidence in the generality of the findings, in Experiment 4 we sampled participants 
from the general population.  
Method 
Experimenters, participants and design. Five M.A. students at the University of 
Amsterdam (3 female and 2 male) addressed a random sample of people on a busy market 
place in Amsterdam, and in a commuter train connecting the inner city of Amsterdam with a 
suburban office and middleclass housing area. Individuals were asked to fill out a brief 
questionnaire, in return for a chance of winning € 20 in a lottery (approx. US$ 20). About 
40% of the people approached agreed to participate (N = 179). The most frequently 
mentioned reasons not to participate were not being able to read and write Dutch, or having 
no time. Fifty-seven percent (n = 101) of the participants were male, and the mean age was 25 
(range between 19 and 59 years). Although 18% (n = 33) did not have the Dutch nationality, 
all participants were fluent in Dutch. Participants were assigned at random to one of three 
conditions (other’s motivation: competitive, cooperative, or unknown). Social value 
orientation was included in the design as a post-hoc blocking factor. Main dependent 
variables were perception of other’s personality, and the likelihood of presenting accurate and 
inaccurate information. 
Procedure and materials. When an individual agreed to participate, he or she received 
the questionnaire and was given about 10 minutes to read the materials and answer the 
questions. To provide the participants with some privacy and still be able to assist should 
something be unclear, the experimenters left them alone for a while but remained nearby. 
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After about 10 minutes the experimenter collected the materials, briefly explained the purpose 
of the study, and wrote down the name and address of the participant if he or she wanted to 
participate in the lottery. 
The questionnaire was introduced as a study about how people make decisions 
involving the purchase of goods and services. Immediately thereafter, we assessed the 
participant’s social value orientation using a paper-and-pencil version of the decomposed 
game method employed in Experiment 3. Twenty-eight per cent of the participants (n = 51) 
were pro-socially motivated, 17% (n = 30) were competitively motivated, 42% (n = 75) were 
individualistically motivated, and 13% (n = 23) could not be classified. The relatively low 
percentage of pro-socials (28%) is not inconsistent with previous research (e.g., De Dreu & 
McCusker, 1997; Dehue, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1993), and suggests no preponderance of 
helpful people with a pro-social orientation. As in Experiment 3, competitively and 
individualistically motivated individuals were combined into the overarching category 
"selfish."  
Once participants had completed the value orientation measure, they were asked to 
imagine selling their car. They read an advertisement they had, presumably, placed in a local 
newspaper (i.e., information available to the potential buyer as well). They were also given 
some background information about the car that was not mentioned in the advertisement (i.e., 
not available to the potential seller), which created opportunity for deception and 
misrepresentation. Specifically, it was explained that the odometer had been replaced, so that 
the actual mileage of the car was higher than displayed on the odometer, that the gearshift 
worked properly, but would need to be replaced in the nearby future, that they did not care for 
the radio and intended to leave it in the car, and that they wanted to keep the car for a few 
more weeks before actually selling it.  
Manipulation of other’s motivation. Participants were then told to imagine meeting a 
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prospective buyer (all scenarios involved a male potential buyer) they recalled from a party 
some time ago, who himself, however, did not recognize them. In the cooperative-other 
condition, they read that they remembered the prospective buyer as a pleasant and warm 
person who was interested in other people and seemed to care for other people’s well being. 
In the competitive-other condition, participants read that they remembered him as an 
unpleasant and cold person who was interested in himself only and did not appear to consider 
other people’s well being. In the unknown-other condition, participants read that while they 
remembered having met the person before, they could not remember any details about him.  
Dependent variables. Participants were presented with four brief scenarios. In each 
scenario, the buyer mentions one of the features of the car he was unaware of. The participant 
was then asked to rate the likelihood of responding by providing accurate information and of 
reacting with an active lie (on scales from 1 = very unlikely, to 5 = very likely).  
In the first scenario, the buyer mentions the low mileage. Participants were asked to 
indicate whether they would inform the buyer about the replacement of the odometer and 
provide accurate information about the actual mileage (first accurate information), and 
whether they would confirm the buyer’s observation and stress the low mileage (first active 
lying). In the second scenario, the buyer inquires about the condition of the gearshift. 
Participants were asked whether they would tell the buyer that it needs to be fixed soon 
(second accurate information), and whether they would tell the buyer that the gearshift was 
fine (second active lying). In the third scenario, the buyer asks if he could buy the radio. 
Participants were asked to indicate whether they would tell the buyer that they wanted to 
leave it in the car anyway (third accurate information), and whether they would say that they 
wanted to keep the radio, but would sell it for a higher price than what the buyer offered 
(third active lying). Finally, in the fourth scenario, the buyer asked if he could buy the car, but 
take it over one month later. Participants were asked to indicate whether they would mention 
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that they also favored to keep the car another month (fourth accurate information), and 
whether they would state that keeping the car causes difficulties and that this would only be 
possible when the buyer pays a higher price in return (fourth active lying). 
After the respondents had indicated their responses to the four scenarios, they were 
asked how they perceived the prospective buyer. As in the first three experiments, 
participants rated the other party's competitiveness. Because participants filled out the 
questionnaire in noisy environments, we included several instruction checks in which crucial 
aspects of the scenarios were repeated and participants were asked to indicate, without 
looking back, whether the statement was true or false. Finally, age, gender, and nationality 
was assessed, and, to control for negotiation experience, participants were asked how often 
they negotiate at work (1 = hardly ever, to 5 = very often), and how often they had sold a car 
in the past 10 years.  
Results  
Treatment of the data and manipulation checks. Eight respondents had to be removed 
from the sample due to missing values, another fourteen were removed because they 
answered one or more instruction checks incorrectly, and twenty-three respondents were 
removed because they could not be classified as pro-social or selfish. All analyses were based 
on the data of 136 participants. Demographic variables were neither associated with the 
provision of accurate or inaccurate information, nor did they interact with other’s motivation 
or social value orientation.  
A 3 (other’s motivation) x 2 (social value orientation) ANOVA on the ratings of 
other’s competitiveness revealed a main effect of other’s motivation, F(2, 127) = 4.15, p < 
.02, showing that the buyer was seen as more cooperative in the cooperative-other condition 
(M = 1.98, SD = 0.96) than in the competitive-other condition (M = 2.51, SD = 1.30). In the 
unknown-other condition, ratings were intermediate (M = 2.12, SD = 0.88) and did not differ 
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from the other two according to a Duncan test (p < .05). A main effect of own social value 
orientation, F(1, 127) = 13.22, p < .001, revealed that pro-social participants rated their buyer 
as more cooperative (M = 2.67, SD = 1.20) than did selfish participants (M = 2.00, SD = 
0.96).  
Provision of accurate and inaccurate information. Scores of accurate information and 
of active lying were entered as dependent variables into a 3 x 2 x 4 x 2 ANOVA with other’s 
motivation (cooperative vs. competitive vs. unknown) and own social value orientation (pro-
social vs. selfish) as between-participants factors and scenario (1 vs. 2 vs. 3. vs. 4) and 
information (accurate information vs. active lying) as within-participants factor. A main 
effect of information revealed that, overall, participants considered it more likely to provide 
accurate information than to engage in active lying (M = 3.16, SD = 1.02; vs. M = 2.37, SD = 
0.87; F(1,130) = 27.40, p < .001). A significant main effect of scenario, F(3, 128) = 26.51, 
and an interaction of scenario with information, F(3, 128) = 9.22 (both ps < .001), indicated 
in the third scenario (selling the radio instead of giving it the seller for free), both active lying 
and provision of accurate information was rated as more likely than in the other scenarios, 
and that in the fourth scenario (asking money for handing over the car some weeks later, 
despite the fact that this was profitable for the seller as well) lying was rated more likely than 
in the other three scenarios.  
Of greater theoretical importance is the significant interaction of information with 
other’s motivation, F(2, 130) = 18.89, p < .001, indicating that participants rated it more 
likely to give accurate information to a cooperative (M = 3.59, SD = 0.97) rather than 
competitive other (M = 2.58, SD = 0.81), with an unknown other in between (M = 3.24, 
SD = 0.98). Participants also rated it more likely to actively deceive a competitive (M = 2.79, 
SD = 0.95) rather than cooperative buyer (M = 2.02, SD = 0.59), with an unknown buyer 
falling in between (M = 2.36, SD = 0.87). This pattern of results supports Hypothesis 1 and 
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validates the results of Experiments 1 to 3.  
ANOVA also revealed an interaction among information, own social value 
orientation, and other's motivation, F(2, 130) = 5.90, p < .01. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, 
the effect of other's motivation was stronger for pro-social participants than for selfish ones. 
Table 7 shows the means for providing accurate information and for active lying (collapsed 
over scenario). In the cooperative-other condition, pro-social individuals were more willing to 
give accurate information than did selfish individuals. In the competitive-other condition, 
however, pro-social individuals were less willing to give accurate information than did selfish 
participants. This effect reflects the over-assimilation phenomenon predicted in Hypothesis 3, 
and validates the findings of Experiment 3. In the unknown-other condition, pro-socials 
tended to rate being accurate as more likely than selfish individuals, but this difference was 
not significant.  
General Discussion 
Lying and deception have been studied in a variety of disciplines, from a variety of 
perspectives. In social psychology, the bulk of the research effort has been focused on 
discovering whether and how people’s emotional display and nonverbal expressions change 
when telling lies in contrast to telling the truth (e.g., DePaulo, 1992; Ekman et al., 1988), and 
vice versa, whether and to what extent people are able to distinguish liars from truth-tellers 
(e.g., Vrij, 2001). In the current study, we approached the issue from a different angle and 
examined when, how, and why people in social decision-making engage in lying and 
deception. Based on interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 
1996, 2003) and related research conducted in the behavioral decision tradition (e.g., Boles et 
al., 2000; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Murnighan et al., 1999), several hypotheses were 
developed and tested by means of a newly developed Information Provision Game. In a 
nutshell, results showed that (1) individuals engage in more lying and deception when their 
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counterpart is competitive rather than cooperative; (2) the provision of accurate and 
inaccurate information is correlated with fear of being exploited, with greed, and with 
punitive sentiment; (3) individuals deceive a competitive other because of greed, fear of 
exploitation, and perhaps also because of the activation of punitive sentiments; (4) compared 
to individuals with a selfish orientation, those with a pro-social orientation are more honest 
towards a cooperative other and more deceitful towards a competitive other; and (5) 
regardless of their social value orientation, individuals deceive a competitive other in such a 
way that their outcomes appear negative when the other gets zero, and as exceeding other’s 
outcomes when the other gets positive outcomes.  
Theoretical Implications 
Our work built upon two related theoretical accounts--interdependence theory (Kelley 
& Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996, 2003), and goal expectation theory (Pruitt & 
Kimmel, 1977). We further used insights from research in a behavioral decision tradition 
(Boles et al., 2000; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Kagel & Roth, 1995; Murnighan et al., 
1999). Our study contributes to each of these lines of inquiry and we will discuss them 
consecutively. 
Goal expectation theory derives from, and largely focuses on, cooperative and 
competitive choice behavior in the context of classic experimental games like the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game. It predicts that individuals become cooperative only when they (a) have 
cooperative goals, and (b) expect their counterpart to have cooperative goals too (Pruitt & 
Kimmel, 1977). Our results are highly consistent with this general prediction, and extend goal 
expectation theory to the domain of lying and deception. That is, from our experiments we 
can conclude that individuals provide truthful information only when (a) their counterpart is 
believed to be cooperative, and (b) they themselves have a pro-social value orientation.  
Goal expectation theory is related to interdependence theory, developed by Kelley and 
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Thibaut (1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). Like goal expectation theory, interdependence 
theory is primarily concerned with cooperative and non-cooperative behavior in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma type of situations (for recent extensions towards other interdependent situations 
such as negotiation, and close relationships, see e.g., De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van 
Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 1997). Within interdependence theory, social value 
orientations and expectations about other’s goals and intentions play a key role. As far as we 
know, however, no past research explicitly considered lying and deception as a function of 
social value orientation, or expectations about other’s goals. The fact that our results were 
highly consistent with findings obtained in more traditional research focusing on cooperative 
and non-cooperative choice behavior indicates that key features of interdependence theory 
also apply to other types of behavior than cooperative and non-cooperative choices. 
Consistent with both goal expectation theory and interdependence theory, we obtained 
strong evidence that lying and deception vis-à-vis a competitive other is motivated by a desire 
to do well oneself (greed), and some evidence that it is motivated by fear of being exploited. 
It is interesting to note that greed appeared to motivate withholding accurate information as 
well as giving inaccurate information. Fear, in contrast, appeared to motivate only 
withholding accurate information, and was not related to giving inaccurate information. In 
other words, our results suggest that greed motivates a reduction in cooperative behavior, as 
well as an increase in competitive behavior, while fear only motivates a reduction in 
cooperative behavior. This may indicate that fear of being exploited activates avoidance 
tendencies and a desire to escape the situation, whereas greed activates an approach tendency. 
Intuitively this seems appealing, but research is needed to examine this issue. Also, this result 
suggests that being honest and being deceptive are not the end points of one and the same 
continuum. Rather, they appear to be different types of behavior that can be motivated by the 
same, or by different goals.  
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Taking account of recent theory and research, we proposed a third possible motive 
underlying lying and deception, namely punitive sentiments (Price et al., 2002; see also 
Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). In Experiment 2, we found that lying and deception were 
positively correlated with punitive sentiment, but we were unsuccessful in manipulating 
various levels of punitive sentiment. Drawing on social dilemma research, we argued that 
punitive sentiment may be stronger for some individuals than for others. Consistent with this, 
Experiment 3 and 4 revealed the so-called over-assimilation effect--the tendency for pro-
social individuals to be even more competitive (i.e., deceptive) towards competitive others 
than selfish individuals are (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Van Lange, 1992). The over-
assimilation effect is usually explained by arguing that pro-social individuals try to "teach the 
competitive other a lesson," an explanation strongly compatible with the punitive sentiment 
motive studied in Experiment 2. Results could have been stronger, because the test for 
mediation in Experiment 2 failed, and no measures of punitive sentiment were included in 
Experiment 3 and 4. Nevertheless, results suggest that lying and deception can be motivated 
by punitive sentiments--the desire to punish the other for observed or expected wrongdoing. 
Future research could examine this issue in more detail. 
Our experimental game, and some of our predictions, were inspired by research 
conducted in a behavioral decision approach to mixed-motive interdependence. Within this 
approach, decision makers are assumed to be bounded in their rationality but otherwise 
motivated to maximize own profit as much as possible (e.g., Boles et al., 2000; Kagel & 
Roth, 1995). Current findings contradict this assumption at least to some extent, in that they 
show that lying and deception were influenced by the participant’s social value orientation as 
well as by the participant’s beliefs about the other’s cooperative or competitive motivation. 
The influence of social value orientations indicates that individuals are motivated by other 
considerations than their immediate self-interest (for a discussion, see Rusbult & Van Lange, 
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1996). The influence of beliefs about other’s cooperative or competitive motivation is 
particularly troublesome for the behavioral decision approach, because self-interest dictates as 
much misrepresentation when the other is cooperative, as when the other is competitive. It 
cannot be understood in terms of immediate self-interest that individuals in a one-shot mixed-
motive situation are open and honest when they believe their counterpart is cooperative (see 
also Paese & Gilin, 2000).  
In contrast to previous research on lying and deception in social decision making, the 
current study allowed us not only to examine the extent to which individuals misrepresent 
their preferences and priorities, but also the direction in which they try to mislead their 
counterpart. Participants knew the situation was one in which own and other’s interests were 
opposed--the more the decision maker would get the less they themselves would obtain, and 
vice versa. As decision makers were only informed about their outcomes, and not about those 
of the participant, they were ignorant about the exact structure of the situation. Participants 
could accurately or inaccurately describe the situation to the decision maker by providing 
accurate or inaccurate information about their own prospective outcomes, and thus influence 
the alleged consequences of the counterpart’s decision making for both the other’s and their 
own outcomes. Experiment 1 and 3, moreover, showed that when facing a cooperative other, 
participants provided information that would (accurately) indicate they and their counterpart 
were in an opposed-interest situation. When facing a competitive other, participants gave 
information that would (inaccurately) indicate they and their counterpart were in a situation in 
own outcomes were negative when the other gets zero, and exceeding other’s outcomes when 
these are positive (see also Figure 2). 
Why would one accurately describe a situation as involving opposed interests when 
the other is believed to be cooperative, and inaccurately describe the situation as involving 
compatible interests when the other is believed to be competitive? The answer to this 
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question may be that facing a cooperative other triggers a cooperative mind-set that directs 
the participant towards honesty and cooperative behavior. This results in the provision of 
accurate information and, by default, a description of the situation as involving opposed 
interests. Given the other pursues a cooperative goal and seeks a fair distribution, this pattern 
of honest and accurate behavior may result in the other favors the mid-point of the scale in the 
decision game (i.e., level y), thus providing both him- or herself and the participant with 
equally distributed outcomes that are neither great nor bad from a personal perspective. 
Facing a competitive other, in contrast, triggers a competitive mind-set that directs the 
participant towards dishonesty and competitive behavior. Greed, and to some extent fear, 
leads one to misrepresent one’s preferences and priorities in a way that the situation appears 
as providing negative outcomes when the other gets zero (i.e., at level z), and as exceeding 
other’s outcomes when these are positive (i.e., at level x). Indeed, in all experiments about 
half of the participants in the competitive other condition displayed this pattern. Given that 
the other pursues a competitive goal and seeks to maximize relative advantage, the “rational” 
choice in the situation described by the participant would be to opt for level x because this 
supposedly gives the other 0 and the participant some negative outcome; all other options in 
the situation described by the participant would provide the decision maker with less than the 
participant, and thus move the decision maker away rather than towards his or her 
competitive goal. In other words, with a cooperative other people are honest and describe the 
situation accurately. With a competitive other people engage in rather sophisticated forms of 
strategic misrepresentation in which other’s competitive goal and his or her most likely 
course of action is taken into account when (misre)presenting information about the task 
structure. 
The Information Provision Game 
The contributions to theory discussed above largely derive from a newly developed 
  Lying and Deception     45 
 
Information Provision Game. The game was modeled after the dictator game (Camerer & 
Thaler, 1995, Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000) and resembles the social interaction situation 
where one party has to decide whether to provide the other with information about one’s 
preferences and priorities. In the Information Provision Game, the participant’s own 
outcomes depend on a decision made by their counterpart. For each of the decision options 
the counterpart faces, the participant has full information about the payoffs to both oneself 
and the counterpart. The counterpart, in contrast, is believed to be informed only about his or 
her own payoffs, and to have no information about the consequences of his or her choice to 
the outcomes of the participant. Participants are given the possibility to provide information 
about the consequences the other’s decision would have for the participants' outcomes. By 
providing accurate or inaccurate information, participants can make some options appear 
more or less attractive and thus try to steer the other’s decision.  
The experimental task allowed us to look at the provision of information in close 
detail, learning about the amount of accurate and inaccurate information presented, and about 
the direction of deceit. This is, we believe, an important advance over earlier studies on lying 
and deception that were able to code only whether lying or deception occurred or not. Two 
questions require an answer. First, the reader may wonder whether findings obtained with this 
new game generalize to other settings. We believe they do, because the findings obtained in 
Experiment 3 were replicated in Experiment 4, which used a more conventional transaction 
decision setting used in previous research on lying and deception (see e.g., Schweitzer & 
Croson, 1999). Moreover, the results are highly consistent with those obtained in studies 
using face-to-face negotiation games (e.g., Murnighan et al., 1999; O’Connor & Carnevale, 
1997). Second, the reader may feel the situation is set up in such a way that participants could 
easily guess the hypothesis and try to conform to the experimenter’s expectations. Although 
we cannot rule out the possibility that demand characteristics explain some of the results, it is 
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unlikely that participants could accurately anticipate the over-assimilation effect found in 
Experiments 3 and 4. Equally unlikely, it seems, is that participants guessed our hypothesis 
about the direction of deceit, which was confirmed in Experiments 1 to 3. Thus, the more 
interesting and important results obtained by means of the Information Provision Game (a) 
are difficult to explain in terms of demand characteristics, and (b) generalize to other settings. 
This being said, it should be noted that some features of the Information Provision 
Game might have facilitated lying and deception. The setting ruled out negative long-term 
effects of lying (cf., Boles et al., 2000), participants did not have to fear that others may detect 
their lies by noticing a telltale incongruous facial expression (Drolet & Morris, 2000). 
Moreover, participants could have seen their lack of decision power as a justification for lying 
(Deutsch, 2000). Obviously, these features may affect the overall base rate of lying and 
deception but not the specific effects of experimental manipulations. The fact that we 
replicated the key findings of Experiments 1 and 3 with a more traditional methodology in 
Experiment 4 suggests that the effects of the experimental manipulations are valid and 
reliable. Moreover, the features just noted can be easily altered, for example to study lying 
and deception as a function of visual access, decision power, concern for long-term 
relationships, or concern with reputation. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Most research on the social psychology of lying and deception has been devoted to 
understanding the human ability to convincingly deceive others (e.g., Vrij et al., 2001b) or to 
detect lying and deception by others (see DePaulo et al, 2003). To ascertain when and why 
individuals provide accurate or inaccurate information about their preferences and priorities 
in social decision situations, we developed the Information Provision Game, which allows 
one to simultaneously study (a) the amount of information people provide, (b) the accuracy or 
inaccuracy of the information people provide, and (c) how people represent or misrepresent 
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their preferences and priorities. Results showed that individuals are less honest and engage in 
more deception when their counterpart is believed to be competitive rather than cooperative, 
and that this effect is stronger for individuals with a pro-social rather than a selfish 
orientation. Second, greed and fear both predict being honest, and greed but not fear predicts 
being deceitful. Finally, individuals facing a competitive other engage in sophisticated forms 
of strategic misrepresentation that may direct competitive others to do exactly the opposite of 
what their goal prescribes them to do--to hurt him or herself, and to help the participant get 
great outcomes.  
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Table 1 
Payoff Schedule used in Experiment 1 (Participants are Player 1) 
     
  Outcome to Player 1  Outcome to Player 2  
Issue A Issue B  Issue A  Issue B  
Zero-Sum Task  
 
Level x   0   0   6   2 
Level y   3   1   3   1 
Level z  6   2    0   0 
Variable-Sum Task  
 
Level x   0   0   2   6 
Level y   3   1   1   3 
Level z  6    2   0   0 
Incomplete Information Task 
 
Level x   0   0    
  Level y   3   1    
Level z  6   2 
Note. Participants (player 1) were told that their (fake) player 2 did not receive information about 
the player 1’s outcomes, and only received information about the own (player 2) outcomes.
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Table 2 
Amount of Accurate and Inaccurate Information as a Function of Other’s Motivation; 
Experiment 1 
Other’s Motivation    
Cooperative Competitive Unknown 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Accurate Information  3.23a   0.84c  2.25b 
(2.36)  (1.23)  (2.31) 
Inaccurate Information 2.08a  4.26b  2.63a 
   (2.44)  (1.89)  (2.39) 
Total Information  5.31a  5.10a  4.38a 
    (1.33)   (1.94)  (1.71) 
_______________________________________________________________________  
 
Note.  a,b,c Means within one row not sharing the same subscript differ at p < .05. Standard 
deviations in parentheses 
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Table 3 
Presented Value of Issues A and B, broken down for Other’s Motivation; Experiment 1 
 
   Issue A  Issue B paired-sample t(df) p 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Other’s Motivation  
Cooperative  2.35 (2.98) 1.55 (2.98)  3.29 (52)  < .005 
Competitive  2.19 (2.39) 2.67 (2.30) -1.73 (39)  < .10 
Unknown  2.51 (1.62) 1.88 (2.16)  1.77 (49)  < .10 
_______________________________________________________________________  
Note. Numbers in parentheses in the first and the second column are standard deviations. 
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Table 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of the Main Dependent Variables in Experiment 2 
 
    M SD 2 3 4 5 6  
 
1. Honesty    2.02 1.11 -.20† -.22† -.01 .37** -.38** 
2. Fear of Exploitation  3.60 1.29  .19 .38** -.35** .17 
3. Greed    3.96 1.30   .04 -.47*** .45*** 
4. Punitive Sentiment   2.81 1.38    -.25* .18 
5. Accurate Information  1.07 1.54     -.74***   
6. Inaccurate Information  4.01 1.98      
Note. †p < .10 *p < .05. **p < .01 (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
Amount of Accurate and Inaccurate Information as a Function of Experimental Condition; 
Experiment 2    
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Other’s Decision is Consequential to 
 Other (only) Self (only) Both Self and Other   
Accurate Information   1.70a   1.08b  0.32c   
     
(1.87)  (1.49)  (0.58)      
Inaccurate Information  3.39a  4.04b  5.05c    
    (2.13)  (2.03)  (1.31) 
Note.  a,b Means within one row not sharing the same subscript differ at p < .05.  
Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Table 6 
Amount of Accurate and Inaccurate Information as a Function of Social Value Orientation and Other’s Motivation; Experiment 3 
 
Social Value Orientation 
Pro-social       Selfish 
 
Other’s Motivation  Cooperative Competitive Unknown  Cooperative Competitive Unknown 
Accurate Information  3.90a  0.50d  1.82bc   2.44b  1.11c  1.95bc  
(2.34)   (1.10)   (2.02)    (2.06)   (1.09)  (1.96) 
Inaccurate Information 1.67d  4.63a  3.59abc   2.89c  4.22ab  3.10bc  
   (2.31)  (1.75)  (2.15)   (2.14)  (1.45)  (2.22) 
Note.  a,b,c,d Means within one row not sharing the same subscript differ at p < .05.  
Standard deviations in parentheses  
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Table 7  
Amount of Accurate and Inaccurate Information as a Function of Social Value Orientation and Other’s Motivation; Experiment 4 
 
Social Value Orientation 
Pro-social       Selfish 
 
Other’s Motivation  Cooperative Competitive Unknown  Cooperative Competitive Unknown 
Accurate Information  4.02d  2.11a  3.50cd   3.44cd  2.74b  3.11bc  
(0.89)   (0.90)   (0.85)    (0.97)   (0.71)  (1.02) 
Inaccurate Information 2.02a  3.23c  1.88a   2.02a  2.64b  2.59b  
   (0.49)  (0.93)  (0.71)   (0.63)  (0.92)  (0.86) 
n   11  11  17   31  31  35 
Note.  a,b,c,d Means within one row not sharing the same subscript differ at p < .05.  
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Figure 1a. The Computer Screen Participants Saw when Providing Information  
 
Note. This is the version as shown in Expt. 2, Expt. 3, and in the zero-sum task condition of Expt. 1. Translated from Dutch. Once a 
participant entered a number (or question mark) in the xA cell of the Communication Screen, a new question prompted the participant 
to enter a number in cell yA, and so on until all cells were filled. Only then could the "send" function be used. 
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Figure 1b. Hypothetical Patterns of Information given to a Cooperative (Left Panel) or Competitive (Right Panel) Other.   
 
 
Note. The hypothetical patterns actually resemble what was found for the "direction of deceit" measures taken in Expt. 1 and 3 (see 
also Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Information About the Value of each Level as a Function of Other’s Motivation; Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
